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U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS AND THE FATE OF RESERVE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN SUPPORT OF CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS
"The process of going to war has not been easy for Army Reserve Soldiers".
--LTG James R. Helmly between the end of the war and the establishment of a stable foreign government capable of providing essential services." 2 CA is that element that brings stability, and often times humanitarian assistance, to a war torn area after the "fighting" has ended. CA does this by executing the combatant commander's phase four (transition) plan in assisting the host nation to reconstruct its institutions and take care of its populace.
Civil Affairs is inherently a responsibility of command. The commander who fails to incorporate CA support into his campaign plan runs the risk of having his tactical successes erode and ultimately lose the strategic goal of the fight. CA provides expertise in stability and peacekeeping operations that allow the combatant commander the flexibility to help the host nation rebuild their infrastructure and become self governing again. There are four mission areas for Army CA, each having significant operational law guidelines: Conventional operations, support for special operations, civil administrations, and military assistance to domestic civil authorities. 3 The CA community is a relatively small one. objective becomes "stability". 13 CA assets provide essential assistance to the commander with his transition to theater stability. To that end commanders also need a transition plan for CA. CA
does not stay until all political goals are achieved, but rather develops the process by which agencies such as the United Nations, US Agency for International Development, and the NonGovernmental Organization community can finish the long-term job of stabilization. The military's challenge is to determine when to disengage CA assets and transition to civilian control.
THE HISTORY OF CIVIL AFFAIRS
The US Army has been involved in managing civilian affairs of occupied territory since the Mexican War, but had no units solely dedicated to the task. CA was initially referred to as "Military Government" during World War II and was established to meet requirements for military specialists to administer areas liberated from Germany and Japan and to govern occupied areas in Germany and Japan during and after the war. 14 After World War II those units designated as "Military Government" were renamed "Civil Affairs." Few lessons were learned in Korea or Viet Nam with regards to CA. Winning the military victory was the primary concern for both the military and their political leaders. 
CIVIL AFFAIRS TODAY
Today's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is heavily dependent on RC CA assets. Since Policy" contributed to the revitalization of the RC. It signaled a return to the traditional reliance on the reserve components during war and extended that reliance to many additional operations. 26 The reserves were assigned capabilities not needed in the active force structure but which in a time of war or national emergency would be required.
27
There are numerous reasons for increased reserve forces use, specifically Army Reserve CA, over the past 15 years. However, initiatives are under way to decrease the impact of using the reserves. For example, there are initiatives to change force structure, personnel policies, terms of service, and out-dated policies in order to create more rotational depth, improve readiness, enhance support to combatant commanders, and provide more predictability to the lives of Army Reserve soldiers. 28 The challenge for Army Reserve CA soldiers is to meet current missions, yet build for the future (transform). T. Trent Gegax of Newsweek writes "The Iraqi war has required the massive mobilization of Army Reservists -all those citizen soldiers who are doing the constable and civil affairs jobs at the heart of nation-building." He further adds that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's "rebalancing" would convert the most heavily used reserve jobs (a portion of civil affairs among them) into active duty positions. His purpose would be to eliminate the need for reservists to be called to active duty so often and so early. However, the Army Reserve leadership believes that such action will blunt the skills of future civil affairs soldiers because as reservists, civil affairs soldiers hone their craft when they are demobilized and working their lawand-order and government jobs back home. 29 In a memorandum to Department of Defense (DoD) leaders dated 9 July 2003, Rumsfeld addressed the need for rebalancing. Specifically, he stated "The balance of the capabilities in the Active and Reserve components today is not the best for the future. We need to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process". 30 While Secretary Rumsfeld did not directly address any one military service or branch it is clear that he was looking at the CA community as one of the catalysts for his rebalancing effort.
In an attachment to the original memorandum, under the heading "Actions for Force
Rebalancing", it states "…Specifically address capabilities that reside exclusively or predominantly in the RC and are in high demand because of on-going operations and the Global War on Terror, capabilities that are required for homeland defense missions, and capabilities critical to post hostilities operations ". 31 specialized, skill rich support functions…". 33 While it is certain that more than just CA was a part of this dramatic role change, there can be no doubt that CA deployments to places such as Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo were a large part of the Army Reserve's transformation during the '90's. LTG Helmly further posits that "…Transforming the Army Reserve is not an option but a requirement that must be met…Operation Iraqi Freedom has added urgency to this requirement to transform." 34 This last statement gets at the heart of the problem faced by CA.
Unless there is reengineering of the mobilization process and the building of a true rotational force the limited CA forces will be completely expended and their expertise lost or greatly diminished for the future fight. Mobilization authority, as prescribed by Title 10 U.S. Code only allows for service members to be mobilized for up to two years for a single operation. With no ability to involuntarily recall them for at least two years for the same operation.
THE WAY AHEAD FOR CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES
While it remains uncertain what future operations will require, RC CA forces are likely to be needed to perform missions ranging from peacekeeping to contingency and stability operations. Throughout the recent past RC CA has shown it can meet the expectations of the military commander in a wide ranging spectrum of operations. What has become increasingly evident is that the RC CA is extremely effective when it exploits the civilian based skills of its personnel. 35 Today whenever US military forces are deployed, RC CA forces can be found working side-by-side with their active duty counterparts. The future use of RC CA forces is dependent upon several important factors. One factor is the degree to which the Army will continue to rely on the RC citizen soldier. This would not be an issue in the event of a major theater war where demand for RC participation is obvious. There is little doubt that the RC will continue to be required in large numbers and in many specialty areas if this high level of support is needed. 36 However, what about a future similar to what we have now -two separate, long term fights (Iraq and Afghanistan) ongoing simultaneously along with the support of two peacekeeping operations (Bosnia and Kosovo). Long-term reliance on the RC CA force at the current level of demand has caused significant problems for a force not designed for sustained levels of support needed for current peacetime operations and day to day activities 37 in a post conflict/hostility environment.
Evidence is beginning to emerge to suggest that longer first rotations will make it difficult to retain personnel for their eventual rotation back to theater. In September six years or more, the current system won't sustain that. It needs to be restructured." 42 At least for CA it is obvious we have reached that point. The US Army is entering into its third year in
Afghanistan and about to embark on its second year in Iraq. How long they spend in the Horn of Africa and Liberia is unknown at this point.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the CA community cannot maintain the pace the Army has set for them.
With over 70 percent of the CA specialists already having been deployed in support of ONE, OEF and OIF. The number of personnel are just not available to provide assistance to the combatant commander. Continued inability to retain soldiers with the skills to conduct peacekeeping and stability operations will leave the Army with an undermanned and underqualified personnel base to conduct such missions. Also, once used in a 24-month mobilization, by law they cannot be mobilized for a year. And then only for a different operation.
Over the near term-that is about the next 12 months-the Department of Defense plans to deploy a substantial fraction of its ground forces for occupation duty in Iraq. Over longer periods, however, the need to maintain training and readiness levels, limit family separation and involuntary mobilization, and retain high-quality personnel would most likely constrain the US occupation force to be smaller than it is now. 43 The current plan for the next rotation of RC CA to the five hostile-fire areas is equal to about 1,100 personnel. Further reducing the personnel available to support current and future operations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is little doubt the Army must address the issues confronting the RC CA community.
There are four actions that could be taken to alleviate the strain on those reservists who make follow-on missions as needed. This would also mean that the RC mobilizations and deployments could be shorter than one year as currently proposed, and still support missions at current levels.
A third option is to offer economic incentives for volunteers to extend in selected current assignments or to return to previous assignments. More RC CA personnel could be provided for post conflict missions during the next one to three years without causing undue hardship, by supplementing mobilized personnel with volunteers. Personnel who had already been deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan or the Horn of Africa and would not be scheduled for another deployment might be offered a bonus to voluntarily extend their tours or take an additional tour. The extension would be in a status other than mobilization such as a temporary tour of active duty (TTAD). Such a bonus, or offer of TTAD, would encourage some individuals to accept more frequent deployments voluntarily, and could, in turn, alleviate the stress that increasing deployment tempo would have for some personnel, particularly for those with family or civilian employment demands.
Lastly, increase structure within the current RC CA units and begin to cross-level from non-deployable or rarely deployed units. This does not create a growth in RC end-strength but would provide spaces in already established units that could be filled to alleviate the current strain. The training curve would be nominal since the whole concept of the RC CA force is the utilization of civilian acquired skills. This recommendation is internal to the RC and consistent with proposals for restructuring provided by the Chief, Army Reserve.
From an internal perspective all of these could work if applied appropriately. Most likely a combination of the above scenarios could be executed to shape and rebalance the force. For instance, option three could provide short-term relief while option four is a mid-term solution.
Option two would take longer to implement and depends on legislative changes. Before any of them can be implemented it will take a concerted effort by the Army leadership to agree upon a desirable goal and then a means to achieve that goal. The Army is already addressing the problem but it appears that no immediate solution has been identified and that it might be years before they are able to achieve a rebalancing that will be equitable and useful.
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